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The Flip Side of Financial Synergies:
Coinsurance versus Risk Contamination
May 2013
Abstract
This paper characterizes when joint nancing of two projects through debt increases expected
default costs, contrary to conventional wisdom. Separate nancing dominates joint nancing when
risk-contamination losses (associated to the contagious default of a well-performing project that
is dragged down by a poorly-performing project) outweigh standard coinsurance gains. Separate
nancing becomes more attractive than joint nancing when the fraction of returns lost under
default increases and when projects have lower mean returns, higher variability, more positive
correlation, and more negative skewness. These predictions are broadly consistent with existing
evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin-o¤s, project nance, and securitization.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Codes: G32, G34.
Keywords: Default costs, conglomeration, mergers, spin-o¤s, project nance, risk contamination,
coinsurance.
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1 Introduction
Consider a rm that needs to nance two risky projects through a competitive credit market. The
rm has the choice of nancing the projects either separately with two independent loans or jointly
with a single loan. With either nancing regime, part of the returns are lost to default (or bankruptcy)
costs when creditors do not obtain full repayment. When does joint nancing lead to lower costs than
separate nancing? Answering this question allows us to shed light on the protability of various
corporate nancial arrangements, such as:
 mergers that combine cash ows and the nancing of otherwise separate corporations;
 holding companies, which protect the assets of individual subsidiaries from creditors claims
against other subsidiaries;
 spin-o¤s in which divisions are set up as independent corporations;
 project nance and securitization, in which projects or loans are nanced through separate
special-purpose vehicles.
At least since Lewellen (1971), conventional wisdom in corporate nance has largely settled on
the view that default costs always generate positive nancial synergies, so that joint nancing is
more protable than separate nancing in the absence of other frictions. According to this view,
conglomeration brings about a reduction in the probability of default by allowing a rm to use the
proceeds of a successful project to save an unsuccessful one, which would otherwise have failed.
By aggregating imperfectly correlated cash ows, the argument goes, joint nancing should reduce
expected default costs and increase borrowing capacity. As aptly summarized by Brealey, Myers,
and Allens (2006, page 880) textbook, merging decreases the probability of nancial distress, other
things equal. If it allows increased borrowing, and increased value from the interest tax shields, there
can be a net gain to the merger.
This paper amends this conventional view by revisiting the purely nancial e¤ects of conglom-
eration. We argue that default costs alone create a non-trivial tradeo¤ for conglomeration, even ab-
stracting away from tax considerations and changes in borrowing capacity. While the literature has
mostly focused on the coinsurance benets of conglomeration, we show that the risk-contamination
losses can turn the logic of the conventional argument on its head. Risk contamination losses arise
when the failure of one project drags down another successful project that is nanced jointly, thus
increasing the probability of default and the expected default costs.
To illustrate the e¤ects at work, consider the decision of a nancial conglomerate, such as UBS,
whether to spin o¤ its investment banking division from the private banking operations. As ac-
knowledged by the Financial Times, on the one hand a conglomerate can benet from coinsurance
gains (its investment bank had access to such cheap funding [...] because UBS had a high credit
rating, supported by its private banking business). On the other hand, the conglomerate might
also su¤er from the e¤ects of risk contamination, as a troubled investment-banking unit can drag
down a highly protable private-banking business (the losses [in the investment banking unit] have
prompted clients to withdraw cash from UBSs core wealth management business).1
To best understand the determinants of the tradeo¤ between coinsurance and risk contamination,
we initially focus on a simple setting in which each of two projects has two possible realizations of
returns, either low or high. We constrain nancing to be obtained through standard debt. The low-
return realization is insu¢cient to cover the initial investment outlay, thus generating the possibility
of default. Separate nancing involves two nonrecourse loans, so that, when the repayment obligation
on one loan is not met, creditors do not have access to the returns of the other project. By contrast,
joint nancing aggregates the returns of the two projects, so that default costs are only incurred
when the sum of the returns of the projects falls below the overall repayment obligation required by
the creditors.
The repayment obligation is endogenously determined and depends on the nancing regime,
either separate or joint. In each regime, competition forces creditors to set the repayment obligation
1See UBS does not have luxury of time before it splits up, Financial Times, March 17, 2008, and Integration
loses its attraction, Financial Times, August 13, 2008.
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Figure 1: Joint distribution of returns. Each project i = 1; 2 yields an independent random
return ri with a binary distribution. The return is either low, ri = rL > 0, with probability 1   pi,
or high, ri = rH > rL, with probability pi.
at a level that allows the rm to obtain the projects present value net of the expected default costs.
If the projects are nanced separately, each loan defaults when the corresponding project yields a
low return. If, instead, the projects are nanced jointly, default occurs if the per-project repayment
obligation is higher than the average realized return of the two projects. Similar to the case of
separate nancing, default occurs if the returns of both projects are low (bottom-left realization of
the joint distribution of returns in Figure 1) and does not occur if the returns of both projects are
high (top-right realization). The key to the comparison with separate nancing is whether or not
the required repayment obligation can be met when one project yields a low return and the other
project yields a high return, as illustrated by the top-left and bottom-right realizations in Figure 1.
There are two scenarios. First, suppose that the repayment obligation is below the average of the
high and the low return, as illustrated by the dashed diagonal line in the gure. In this case, the
probability of default and the expected default costs are reduced with joint nancing. Ex post, a
low-return project, which would have defaulted if it had been nanced separately, is saved if the other
project yields a high return. Ex ante, the two projects coinsure each other and there are positive
nancial synergies, equal to the reduction in expected default costs. In turn, a higher probability
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of full repayment forces creditors to reduce the interest rate below the level required under separate
nancing. This coinsurance e¤ect drives the classic logic of good conglomeration (positive nancial
synergies) stressed by Lewellen (1971).
This result is reversed if the per-project repayment obligation is above the average of the high
and the low return, as illustrated by the dotted diagonal line in the gure. In this second scenario,
the probability of default and the expected default costs are actually higher under joint nancing.
Ex post, a high-return project, which would have stayed aoat had it been nanced separately, is
now dragged into default when the other project has a low return. When projects risk-contaminate
each other, there are ex ante nancial dis-synergies (or negative synergies). If the default recovery
rate is low, competing creditors are forced to increase the required interest rate above the level that
results under separate nancing because the loan will be repaid in full less often with joint nancing.
In this case, conglomeration is bad (nancial synergies are negative) due to risk contamination.
The thrust of our analysis consists in characterizing the conditions on the models primitives
such that coinsurance prevails over risk contamination. To this end, we rst solve for the equilibrium
repayment obligations that result in the two nancing regimes, and then determine the region of
parameters for which the borrower is able to nance the projects jointly at a rate below the average
of the high and the low return. In the context of the baseline model of two projects with independent
binary returns, we derive a number of testable comparative statics predictions, such as the following:
 A reduction in the default recovery rate decreases the protability of joint nancing. Given
that the amount available to creditors following default is lower when default costs are higher,
the repayment obligation associated with joint nancing increases with the level of default
costs. It is then more di¢cult for the repayment obligation to be below the average of the high
and the low return. Thus, the protability of joint nancing is reduced. Consistent with this
theoretical prediction, Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that improvements in judicial e¢ciency
and creditor rights signicantly increase M&A activity, while Subramanian, Tung, and Wang
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(2009) nd that project nance is more prevalent than corporate nance in countries with
less-e¢cient bankruptcy procedures and weaker creditor rights.
 For projects where good returns are more likely than bad ones, joint nancing is also less
protable when the projects are riskier. This result is consistent with project nance being
more widespread in riskier countries, as shown empirically by Kleimeier and Megginson (2000)
among others.
 A mean-preserving increase in the negative skewness of the distribution of returns reduces the
attractiveness of joint nancing. This result is consistent with the nding that projects with
negatively skewed returns, due, for example, to expropriation risk, are likely to be nanced on
a project basis (see Esty, 2003). Also, since debt returns are negatively skewed, this suggests
a motive for the use of separate subsidiaries and securitization structures by banks and other
lenders.
In the discussion so far we compared the protability of separate and joint nancing when both
nancing regimes are feasible. In the paper, we also characterize situations in which it is feasible
to nance projects with positive net present value either only separately or only jointly. When the
coinsurance e¤ect prevails, joint nancing increases the borrowing capacity, resulting in projects
that can be nanced jointly but cannot be nanced separately. When risk contamination prevails,
instead, joint nancing decreases the borrowing capacity, so that there are projects that can be
nanced separately but not jointly.
We also show that a rule of thumb that prescribes adopting the nancing regime associated with
the lowest interest rate can be suboptimal. We illustrate situations in which it is more protable for
a rm to nance projects separately, even though joint nancing at a lower interest rate is feasible.
Indeed, when risk contamination prevails, joint nancing can result in a lower interest rate despite
being associated with a higher probability of default. When the recovery rate is su¢ciently high (or,
equivalently, the default costs are su¢ciently low), at any given exogenous promised repayment rate,
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creditors expect to obtain more with joint nancing than with separate nancing because default
occurs more frequently. As a result, competition forces creditors to o¤er a lower rate to rms that
nance projects jointly. This theoretical nding can explain the widespread use of project nance
despite the fact that project debt is often more expensive than corporate debt, solving one of the
apparently counterintuitive features [of project nance] (Esty, 2003).
We then examine the impact of correlation between project returns. Intuitively, when returns are
perfectly negatively correlated, the risk-contamination e¤ect is absent and the coinsurance e¤ect is
so strong that it eliminates default altogether when projects are nanced jointly. As the correlation
increases, separate nancing becomes optimal. In the limit case when returns are perfectly positively
correlated separate nancing and joint nancing are clearly equivalent.
Having illustrated the simple logic of bad conglomeration for distributions with binary returns,
we turn to the more general case with continuous returns. We show that the change in expected
default costs of joint relative to separate nancing can be analytically decomposed into coinsurance
gains and risk contamination losses, which coexist with general continuous distributions. To initially
abstract away from the advantage of the limited liability shelter, we begin by considering distributions
of returns with a positive support, such as truncations of normal distributions. We then extend the
results to distributions (such as the normal) that allow for negative returns and identify again the
coinsurance and risk-contamination e¤ects when limited liability considerations are also present.
Once we calibrate the model with realistic parameter values, we nd that the risk-contamination
e¤ect dominates the coinsurance e¤ect in a number of realistic scenarios. We verify the importance
of risk contamination in a standard calibration of the stable distribution (McCulloch, 1997) that
conveniently captures the skewness and fat tails of nancial data. We also consider a calibration of a
continuous bimodal distribution that has been recently used to explain features of the recent nancial
crisis (El-Erian and Spence, 2012). Conrming numerically the comparative statics predictions we
obtained analytically for the baseline model with binary returns, we show that the risk-contamination
e¤ect dominates if the recovery rate is su¢ciently small (or the nancial distress costs are large), the
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mean is low, the standard deviation is high, the correlation is high, and the skewness is negative.
By clarifying the conditions for the value of conglomeration in the presence of default costs, this
paper contributes to a voluminous literature on the analysis of purely nancial motives for mergers. In
his discussion to Lewellen (1971), Higgins (1971) notes that joint nancing also a¤ects the riskiness
of the lenders returns; hence, we abstract from risk concerns by assuming risk neutrality. Scott
(1977) suggests that, by separating liabilities and selling secured debt, rms can increase the value
of their equity by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured creditors, such as suppliers
and/or unsatised customers who are then unable to obtain compensation from the rm.2 Similarly,
Sarig (1985) shows that if cash ows can be negative, as part of any production process (e.g., when
customer or employee liabilities exceed future income), a rm can exploit the limited liability shelter
of the shareholders and creditors by nancing projects through separate corporations, imposing again
a loss on third-party holders of unsecured claims, such as customers, employees or government.
Our baseline model explicitly abstracts from these limited liability e¤ects by assuming positive
cash ows, so that creditors always break even and third parties are not a¤ected. The nancing
regime a¤ects the rms payo¤s because the creditors zero-prot condition creates an endogenous
limited liability constraint.3 The tradeo¤ in our model can be viewed as a borrowing rms choice of
replacing a single endogenously determined limited liability constraint by two separate constraints.
As a result, in our model separate nancing does not always dominate joint nancing, contrary to
the setting of Scott (1977) and Sarig (1985) with exogenous limited liability constraints.
2However, this judgement proofness e¤ect is inconsistent with the notion of rationality on the part of customers
and suppliers. Once the lower willingness to pay of customers and suppliers is taken into account, Smith and Warner
(1979) argue that the rms earnings should not be a¤ected by the capital structure. See Section 4.2 for a related
discussion and analysis.
3A number of papers (e.g., Higgins and Schall, 1975, and Kim and McConnell, 1977) have analyzed the e¤ect of the
current capital structure on merger incentives. These papers noted that, while mergers may increase total rm value,
bondholders may gain at the expense of shareholders. We abstract from such a distributional conict among (cashless)
stakeholders, by considering the ex ante choice of corporate structure by shareholders and forcing bondholders to
compete and therefore obtain no surplus.
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In a precursor of this paper couched in the context of bank lending, Winton (1999) is the rst to
uncover the possibility of bad conglomeration. Our Proposition 4 develops Wintons (1999) third case
of Proposition 3.1 in which a bank prefers to specialize even though the repayment rate for pooled
projects is lower. Our systematic analysis of the tradeo¤ between coinsurance and risk contamination
delivers a rich set of comparative statics predictions depending on the distributional characteristics
of returns.4
Leland (2007) compares the protability of separate and joint nancing for a borrower who
trades o¤ default costs with tax shields by adjusting the mix of debt and equity. Instead, we
consider xed-investment projects that must be nanced only with debt and thus we explicitly rule
out the possibility of increasing leverage and re-optimizing the capital structure. As a result, unlike
Leland (2007), our analysis uncovers situations in which separate nancing is optimal even when
the amount borrowed through debt does not depend on whether projects are nanced jointly or
separately. In addition, we obtain a comprehensive set of analytical predictions, including the e¤ect
of skewness and other features linked to nonsymmetric return distributions. See Section 4.2 for a
detailed comparison.5
Banal-Estañol and Ottavianis (2013) companion paper allows for nancing through equity at a
tax disadvantage, in addition to debt.6 We show that if the tax advantage of debt is su¢ciently low,
joint nancing is inconsequential because default is avoided altogether under either joint or separate
nancing. At the other extreme, if the tax advantage is su¢ciently high, then no equity is used
4The literature on nancial intermediation under costly state verication is also somewhat related, insofar as this
focuses on how diversication across borrowers can reduce the verication costs of bank depositors when the bank
defaults. Bond (2004) contrasts conglomerate nancing with bank nancing in the case of two independent projects.
His work relies on the assumption that each projects scale requires large numbers of individual investors who cannot
coordinate on costly state verication.
5Our results are also very di¤erent from those of Sha¤er (1994), who studies the e¤ect of joint nancing on the
probability of joint failure. Instead, we compare the rms expected payo¤ when the interest rate is endogenously
determined by competition among creditors.
6As we discuss in the next section, the costly state verication literature shows that debt is the optimal contractual
arrangement if returns are privately observed by the borrower and can be veried by creditors only once default costs
are incurred.
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in either nancing regime so that the choice between separate and joint nancing is the same as
in the debt-only model considered in the present paper. More interestingly, if the tax advantage is
intermediate, joint nancing becomes relatively more protable than in the debt-only model, because
equity nancing makes it more likely to obtain debt repayment rates that avoid risk contamination.
Debt capacity with joint nancing, however, might need to be reduced substantially. At some
point, the tax-disadvantage makes joint nancing again unprotable.7 Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, as shown in the quote of Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006) reported above, conglomeration
is then associated to lessrather than moreborrowing, with resulting losses in terms of tax shields.
John (1993), Hege and Ambrus-Lakatos (2002), and Inderst and Müller (2003) analyze the optimal
corporate structure in models with agency costs due to debt overhang rather than default costs.
For example, in Inderst and Müllers (2003) two-project version of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990),
nancing two projects within the same corporation can reduce the rms ability to borrow when
the rm is able to nance follow-up investments internally without returning to the external capital
market.8 Our predictions for the case with default costs are di¤erent (see, for example, the discussion
following Prediction 2).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. Focusing on a baseline version
of the model with two projects with independent binary returns, Section 3 analyzes the conditions
setting apart nancial synergies from dis-synergies and performs comparative statics with respect
to the default recovery rate and the distribution of returns, such as mean, variance, skewness, and
correlation. Turning to the case of continuous distributions, Section 4 (i) provides an analytical
decomposition of the net nancial synergies in terms of coinsurance gains and risk contamination
losses, (ii) shows through a number of numerical simulations that the risk contamination e¤ect is
empirically important and can outweigh the coinsurance e¤ect in a number of realistic scenarios, and
7The preponderance of debt with separate nancing is consistent with the many empirical studies that nd that a
large proportion of funding in project nance is in the form of debt (see, e.g., Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000).
8See also Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005), who focus on the trade-o¤ between coinsurance and winner-picking
incentives in this setting.
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(iii) obtains comparative statics results that are fully consistent with those of the baseline model.
Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main predictions of our theory and a discussion of avenues
for future research. The Appendix collects the proofs.
2 Model
A risk-neutral rm has access to two ex-ante identical projects. Each project i requires at t = 1
an investment outlay normalized to I = 1 and yields at t = 2 a random payo¤ or return ri with
distribution function F . The projects have positive net present value, but the lowest return realization
possible is insu¢cient to cover the initial investment outlay. Even though we focus for most of the
analysis on the case with independently distributed returns, we also allow for correlated returns.
Before raising external nance, the rm chooses how to group the two projects into stand-alone
corporations. This means that investors in each corporation have access to the returns of all projects
in that corporation, but they do not have access to the returns of the projects in the other corporations
set up by the rm. Financing each project in a separate corporation is equivalent to nancing
through separate nonrecourse loans, while joint nancing of the two projects in a single conglomerate
corporation is equivalent to nancing through a large loan with recourse on the returns of both
projects. Financing for each corporation (or loan) can be obtained in a competitive credit market.
For notational simplicity, we stipulate that the rm seeks nancing only when expecting to obtain a
strictly positive expected payo¤.
Creditors are risk neutral and lend money through standard debt contracts. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the risk-free interest rate to rf = 0. Therefore, creditors expect to make
zero expected prots. This is equivalent to assuming that each corporation makes a take-it-or-leave-
it repayment o¤er to a single creditor for each loan j, promising to repay rj at t = 2 for each
unit borrowed at t = 1.9 Thus rj denotes the promised repayment per project. According to our
9Thus, for the case in which each loan (or corporation) is nanced by multiple creditors, we implicitly assume that
there are no coordination failures across the creditors who syndicate the same loan.
10
accounting convention, this repayment rate comprises the amount borrowed as well as net interest.10
Creditors are repaid in full when the total realized return of the projects pledged is su¢cient
to cover the promised repayment. If instead the total realized return falls short of the repayment
obligation, the corporation defaults and the ownership of the projects realized returns is transferred
to the creditor. Following default, the creditor is only able to recover a fraction  2 [0; 1] of the
realized returns r, so that the default costs following default are equal to (1  ) r.11 As we show
in Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2013), our results hold robustly with a more general structure of
default costs, provided that the economies or diseconomies of scale in default are not too extreme.
We restrict external nancing to be obtained through debt. Note that debt is the optimal
contractual arrangement if we assume that returns are privately observed by the borrower and can
be veried by creditors only at a cost, as in the costly state verication model. As shown by Townsend
(1979), Diamond (1984), and Gale and Hellwig (1985), the optimal nancing arrangement is then
the standard debt contract, under which returns are veried if and only if the borrower cannot repay
the loan in full. Once default (or bankruptcy) costs are re-interpreted as CSV verication costs, the
optimal contractual agreement between the entrepreneur and the creditor is thus a debt contract.
That is, if two projects are available, the optimal contracting strategy is either two separate debt
contracts, each of which is backed by the returns of one project, or one debt contract, which is backed
by the returns of the two projects.
3 Binary Returns
To develop our main insight we initially analyze a baseline specication with two independently
distributed projects with binary returns. Each project i yields either a low return rL with probability
1   p or a high return rH > rL with probability p and this return realization is independent of the
10The net interest rate i satises 1 + i = rj and therefore the repayment obligation can be interpreted as the gross
interest rate. In our setting, given that projects require one unit of investment and they are fully nanced with debt,
the per-project market value of debt is always equal to one.
11For estimates of bankruptcy costs and other costs of nancial distress across industries see, for example, Warner
(1977), Weiss (1990), and Korteweg (2007).
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return of the other project. Even though each project has a positive net present value, (1  p) rL +
prH   1 > 0, the low return is insu¢cient to cover the initial investment outlay, rL < 1.
In Section 3.1 we proceed to examine the conditions for when the borrower is able to nance the
two projects separately and jointly. In Section 3.2 we compare the protability of separate and joint
nancing, when they are both feasible. In Section 3.3 we characterize the e¤ect of conglomeration
on the rms borrowing capacity. In Section 3.4 we derive a set of comparative statics predictions
for the occurrence of joint and separate nancing. In Section 3.5 we present a numerical illustration
of the importance of nancial dis-synergies. In Section 3.6 we show that the nancing option with
the lowest repayment rate is not necessarily optimal. In Section 3.7 we extend the model to allow
for correlation across the returns of the two projects.
3.1 Financing Conditions
Consider rst the possibility of nancing the two projects through two separate nonrecourse loans
or, equivalently, through two di¤erent limited liability corporations. Given that the two projects are
ex ante identical, nancing of each project, if possible, takes place at the same rate. In order for the
creditor to break even, the rate ri must satisfy r

i > 1 > rL. Therefore, there is a positive probability
that the loan is not repaid in full. To ensure that the borrower obtains strictly positive prots, the
rate ri must also satisfy r

i < rH .
Given that the credit market is competitive, creditors must make zero expected prots. Thus the
repayment requested by the creditor, ri , is such that the gross expected proceeds, pr

i + (1  p)rL,
are equal to the initial investment outlay 1. As a result, each project can be nanced through a
separate loan if and only if
ri :=
1  (1  p)rL
p
 rH : (1)
The repayment obligation, which is fully paid only in the case of a high return, is equal to the
investment outlay, 1, less the expected proceeds from default, (1  p)rL, divided by the probability
of staying aoat, p. Intuitively, the creditor needs to recover the expected shortfall in the event of
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default from the event in which the project yields a high return.
Next, consider joint nancing of the two projects through a single loan or, equivalently, within
the same corporation. Denote by rm the equilibrium repayment obligation per unit of investment,
so that 2rm is the total repayment promised to the creditor in return for the initial nancing of the
two projects, 2I = 2. Two cases need to be distinguished, depending on whether or not the required
repayment rate induces default in the case when one project yields a high return while the other
project yields a low return (intermediate returns).
Suppose rst that the equilibrium repayment rate rm is such that rL  r

m 
rH+rL
2 , so that there
is no default with intermediate returns. As a result, the probability of default is reduced to (1  p)2.
Substituting again in the expected creditor prots, the borrower would only be able to obtain this
rate in a competitive market if and only if
rm :=
1   (1  p)2 rL
1  (1  p)2

rH + rL
2
: (2)
Suppose now that the equilibrium rate rm is such that
rH+rL
2  r

m  rH and therefore the
borrower defaults in the event of a high and a low return. Hence, default occurs with probability
1  p2. In a competitive credit market, this rate can be obtained if and only if
rm :=
1   (1  p) (prH + rL)
p2
 rH : (3)
Since the borrowers expected prots for a given distribution are decreasing in the equilibrium rate,
if both conditions (2) and (3) are satised, the borrower prefers rate rm to rate r

m .
12 Summarizing
the results so far, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Financing conditions) Two independent projects can be nanced separately if
and only if condition (1) is satised, in which case the equilibrium rate is ri . Projects can be nanced
jointly if and only if conditions (2) or (3) are satised. If condition (2) is satised, the equilibrium
rate is rm, and if it is not satised, the rate is r

m .
12 It is straightforward to show that if rm > (rH + rL)=2, then r

m > (rH + rL)=2. Therefore, if it is not possible to
obtain rm, then we can disregard the r

m > (rH + rL)=2 constraint.
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3.2 Financial Synergies or Dis-synergies?
When both separate and joint nancing are feasible, which regime is more protable and thus optimal
for the borrower? Obviously, in the absence of default costs (i.e., when  = 1) the borrower is
indi¤erent between nancing the projects separately or jointly. The next proposition states the gains
and losses when  < 1.
Proposition 2 (Separate v. joint nancing) When the borrower can nance two independent
projects separately as well as jointly:
(a) If condition (2) is satised, it is optimal to nance the projects jointly, as the nancial synergies
are positive and equal to the coinsurance gains: CI = p (1  p) (1  )rL.
(b) If condition (2) is not satised, it is optimal to nance the projects separately, as the nancial
synergies are negative and equal to the risk-contamination losses: RC = p (1  p) (1  )rH .
Intuitively, when the borrower obtains a rate that avoids intermediate default, the probability
of default under joint nancing is lower than under separate nancing. The low-return project is
saved from default when the other project yields a high return, thereby reducing the ine¢ciency
associated with default. Per-project expected savings when the projects are nanced jointly rather
than separatelythe coinsurance e¤ectare equal to the probability that the rst project yields
a low return while the second project yields a high return, p(1  p), multiplied by the default losses
avoided, (1  )rL.
If, instead, the borrower obtains a joint rate that does not avoid intermediate default, a project
with low return drags down the other project, increasing the probability of default. Per-project
expected losses when projects are nanced jointly rather than separatelythe risk-contamination
e¤ectare equal to the probability that the rst project yields a high return while the second
project yields a low return, p(1  p), multiplied by the additional default losses incurred, (1  )rH .
The key is whether the equilibrium repayment rate for joint nancing is below or above the
crossing point, (rH + rL) =2. Notice that the crossing point is not necessarily at the mean. In
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particular, if p > 1=2, so that the distribution is skewed to the left (i.e., returns are negatively
skewed), the crossing point is below the mean. As a result, equilibrium rates above the crossing
point are consistent with a probability of default below 50%. The resulting default probabilities are
then 1   p for separate nancing and 1   p2 for joint nancing, which for a high enough p may be
very low.
3.3 Borrowing Capacity
So far we have compared the protability of separate and joint nancing when both nancing regimes
are feasible. As we have seen in Section 3.1, there are situations in which it is feasible to nance
projects with positive net present value either only separately or only jointly. Thus, conglomeration
does not necessarily increase the rms ability to nance projects.
Proposition 3 (Borrowing capacity) Consider two independent projects:
(a) If condition (2) is satised, there are projects that can be nanced jointly but not separately.
(b) If condition (2) is not satised, any project that can be nanced jointly can be nanced separately
and there are projects that can only be nanced separately.
When the coinsurance e¤ect prevails, there are projects that can be nanced jointly but cannot
be nanced separately. In this rst case, conglomeration increases the rms borrowing capacity, as
in Lewellen (1971). However, when risk contamination prevails, joint nancing decreases the rms
borrowing capacity, so that there are projects that can be nanced separately but not jointly.
3.4 Testable Predictions
We now derive comparative statics predictions with respect to changes in the characteristics of the
projects: the recovery rates and the distribution of returns (mean, variability, and skewness). For
each attribute, we study whether separate or joint nancing is optimal for a larger range of the
remaining parameters. At the same time, we contrast our predictions with those from existing
theories and discuss how our predictions on joint and separate nancing match existing empirical
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evidence. Note that joint nancing corresponds to mergers, especially conglomerate mergers, whereas
separate nancing corresponds to spin-o¤s of divisions. Also, as argued by Leland (2007) asset
securitization and project nance are also methods for separately nance activities from originating
or sponsoring organizations by placing them in bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicles (SPVs).
From an analytical perspective, these entities have the key features of separate corporations.
Prediction 1 (Default costs) For higher default costs (lower ) then (a) both joint and separate
nancing can be obtained for a smaller region of parameters and (b) joint nancing is optimal for a
smaller region of the remaining parameters.
Higher default costs decrease pledgeable returns, since the recovered returns in case of default
are lower. Since default costs do not a¤ect the crossing point, (rH + rL)=2, nancing at a rate that
avoids intermediate default is more di¢cult and thus joint nance is less likely. To the best of our
knowledge, this prediction has not been formulated before.
Still, this prediction is consistent with empirical evidence indicating that merger activity is less
likely and project nance is more likely in countries with weaker investor protection. Rossi and Volpin
(2004) show that improvements in judicial e¢ciency and creditor rights signicantly increase M&A
activity. Comparing the incidence of bank loans for project nance with regular corporate loans
for large investments, Subramanian, Tung, and Wang (2009) show that project nancing is more
frequent in countries with less e¢cient bankruptcy procedures and weaker creditor rights. Increases
in these two measures of investor protection decrease the default costs and should favor, according to
our model, joint nancing (mergers or direct investment) over separate nancing (project nance).
Prediction 2 (Mean) For higher probability of a high return (higher p) then (a) both joint and
separate nancing can be obtained for a larger region of parameters and (b) joint nancing is optimal
for a larger region of the remaining parameters.
If the probability of a high return increases, the expected return pledgeable to creditors also
increases. It becomes easier to nance projects, and to nance them jointly at a rate that avoids
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intermediate default.
This prediction contrasts with that of Inderst and Müller (2003). In their model, it is optimal
to keep better projects separate to avoid self-nancing and thus commit to return to the capital
market. The existing empirical evidence on the productivity of conglomerate rmsone of the
testable implications of this predictionis mixed. While Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) nd that
conglomerate rms, for all but the smallest rms in their sample, are less productive than single-
segment rms, Schoar (2002) nds that the productivity of plants in conglomerate rms is higher
than in stand-alone rms.13
During booms, projects might have a higher expectation across-the-board. Our prediction would
then be consistent with a large body of empirical evidence that shows that merger activity usually
heats up during economic booms and slows down in recessions (see, for example, Maksimovic and
Phillips, 2001). Similarly, Cantor and Demsetz (1993) show that o¤-balance sheet activity (separate
nancing) grows following a recession.
Prediction 3 (Mean-preserving spread) Consider the e¤ect of a mean-preserving spread in the
projects return consisting of an increase in the high return rH and a reduction in the low return
rL so as to maintain the mean return constant. Then, there exists p < 1=2 such that the region of
parameters for which joint nancing is optimal decreases if and only if p > p.
That is, a mean preserving spread in the distribution of returns favors separate nancing as long
as the distribution of returns is not too positively skewed. If the distribution is symmetric (p = 1=2),
a mean preserving spread increases rH by as much as it reduces rL. While the crossing point is
una¤ected, the joint nancing rate that avoids intermediate default becomes more di¢cult to obtain
13Still, Schoar (2002) nds that conglomerates are less valued than focused rms (the so-called market diversication
discount), and argues that the discrepancy can be attributed to conglomerates leaving more rents to workers. A
number of papers have also argued that the diversication discount could also be spurious, because of measurement
problems and selection biases. For example, Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) show that acquirers excess values
decline because the business units acquired are already discounted, thus explaining the diversication discount with a
self-selection argument. See also Campa and Kedia (2002), Villalonga (2004), and Custodio (2009).
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because the low return is even lower and the pledgeable returns before the crossing point are lower.
If the distribution of returns is negatively skewed (p > 1=2), the crossing point is decreased and it
becomes even more di¢cult to obtain joint nancing below the crossing point.14
This prediction is consistent with a similar prediction obtained by Leland (2007). Empirical
support can be found in the project nance literature. Kleimeier and Megginson (1999), for example,
nd that project nance loans are far more likely to be extended to borrowers in riskier countries,
particularly countries with higher political and economic risks. They claim that: As a whole,
these geographic lending patterns are consistent with the widely held belief that project nance is a
particularly appropriate method of funding projects in relatively risky (non-OECD) countries.
It is also worth noting that loans and other forms of debt typically have default rates well under
50%. Thus, according to our prediction, increases in loan risk should make it more likely that the
loans are securitized. On the other hand, the relative risk of the loan originator and the loans will
also play a role.
Prediction 4 (Skewness) Consider the e¤ect of a mean-preserving increase in negative skewness
in the projects return consisting of a reduction in the low return level rL and an increase in the
probability of high return p so as to maintain the mean return constant. Then, it becomes optimal to
nance the projects jointly for a smaller region of parameters if and only if the high return level rH
is su¢ciently large.
Increasing negative skewness has two conicting e¤ects. On the one hand, as rL decreases, the
crossing point is reduced and the returns in case of default are lower, so that joint nancing at the
rate that avoids intermediate default becomes more di¢cult. On the other hand, as p increases so as
to keep the mean constant, the probability that both projects returns are low is reduced, so that it
becomes easier to nance the projects at the rate avoiding intermediate default. If rH is su¢ciently
14To maintain the mean constant, a given increase in rH must be combined with a larger decrease in rL, resulting
in a reduction in the crossing point. Formally, from r0H = rH + " and r
0
L = rL   "p=(1   p), we have (r
0
H + r
0
L) =2 =
(rH + rL) =2  " (2p  1) =2 (1  p).
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high, the rst e¤ect dominates and separation becomes optimal for a larger set of parameters. Indeed,
for a given increase in p, one needs a higher reduction in rL to ensure a constant mean.
We can nd support for this prediction in the literature on project nance. For example, Esty
(2003) shows that project nance is widespread when it is possible to lose the entire value due
to expropriation. This type of risk generates returns with large negative skewness, as opposed to
more symmetric risks such those a¤ecting exchange rates, prices, and quantities. Moreover, project
nance is typically used for projects with high potential upside, satisfying the requirement that rH
be su¢ciently high.
3.5 Illustration
We now provide an initial illustration of how joint nancing can result in an increase in expected
default costs for empirically plausible parameter values under the (admittedly strong) assumption
that returns are binary. To this end, we perform a calibration of the four parameters (rH , rL, p, and
) of the model of this section for the case with separate nancing. As representative values, we set:
(i) the probability of default at 2:09% (parametrized by 1   p5 = 0:1) by using Longsta¤, Mittal,
and Neis (2005) estimate of 10% for the default probability on bonds for BBB rated rms with a
ve-year horizon;
(ii) the mean return at 5% (so that [prH + (1  p)rL  1]=1 = 0:05), as in Parrino, Poteshman, and
Weisbach (2005), who use a mean return of 10.63% given a risk-free rate of 5.22%;
(iii) the default recovery rate at  = 65% (based on 35% liquidation losses as percentage of going
concern value) from Alderson and Betker (1995); and
(iv) bankruptcy costs as a fraction of a rms value at 11% (so that (1 )rL=[prH+(1 p)rL] = 0:11),
at the mid point of Bris, Welch, and Zhus (2006) range of estimates of 2% to 20%, at the low end
of Altmans (1984) estimate of 1117% for bankruptcy costs as a fraction of rm value up to three
years before default and more conservative than Kortewegs (2010) estimate of 1530% of rm value
at the point of bankruptcy.
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The calibrated values are then rH = 1:07, rL = 0:33, p = 0:98, and  = 0:65. For these
parameters, it is feasible to nance the projects separately, since ri = 1:02 < 1:07 = rH , as well
as jointly, since rm = 1:02 < 1:07 = rH , but not at the rate below the crossing point, because
rm = 1:01 > 0:70 = (rH + rL) =2. Thus, separate nancing is more protable than joint nancing. In
this illustration, the risk-contamination e¤ect identied in Proposition 2 is p (1  p) (1  ) rH = 0:04,
4% of the investment outlay I = 1, corresponding to 15% of the projects net present value. A key
limitation of this initial numerical illustration is the restriction to binary returns. See Section 4 for
more extensive and realistic calibrations for the model with continuous returns.
3.6 Managerial Implications
We now show that the nancing regime with the lowest repayment rate does not necessarily entail
the lowest likelihood of default and is thus not necessarily optimal. Borrowers would be misguided by
choosing the nancing regime with the lowest interest rate. The following proposition characterizes
when it is more protable to nance projects separately, even though joint nancing is available at
a lower rate.
Proposition 4 (Separate nancing at higher rate) Separate nancing is optimal even though
it results in a higher interest rate if and only if (i) condition (3) is satised but condition (2) is not
satised and (ii)  [prH + (1  p)rL] > 1.
To see what is going on, rst suppose there were no default costs. Because the creditors payo¤ is a
concave function of rm cash ows, it is immediate that, for any xed repayment rate r, the expected
return to the creditor would be higher for joint nancing than for separate nancing, because joint
nancing has per unit returns that are less risky in the sense of second order stochastic dominance
(see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). As a result, the break-even rate for the creditor would be lower
for joint nancing than for separate nancingregardless of whether default occurred more often
or not under joint nancing. Nevertheless, the rms expected cash ows would be the same under
either nancing method, so repayment rate is not a good indicator of which nancing method to use.
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Since there are in fact default costs, the break-even repayment rate must increase to o¤set the
reduced cash ows in default states. If joint nancing does not involve intermediate default (condition
(2) holds), then expected default costs are lower under joint nancing, the break-even rate is lower,
and the rm prefers joint nancing to separate nancing. But if joint nancing involves intermediate
default (condition (2) does not hold but condition (3) holds), then expected default costs are higher
under joint nancing: default occurs more often, and costs once in default are at least as high as under
separate nancing. In this case, default costs make the repayment rate increase more under joint
than under separate nancing, and the rms net expected cash ow is lower under joint nancing.
Still, since without default costs the repayment rate under conglomerate nancing would denitely
be lower than that for separate nancing, the repayment rate with such costs may still be lower.
Condition (ii) of the proposition guarantees that this is the case.
3.7 Correlated Returns
We now extend our baseline specication to add correlation in the distribution of joint returns.
Suppose that the probability of two high returns is equal to p [1  (1  p) (1  )], the probability of
two low returns is equal to (1  p) [1  p (1  )], and the probability that one of the projects yields a
high return whereas the other yields a low one is equal to p (1  p) (1  ). Thus  is the correlation
coe¢cient between the two projects. For the joint probability distribution to be well dened, it is
necessary to assume that   max h  (1  p) =p; p=(1  p)i. Clearly, if  = 0 we are back to the
baseline scenario with independent returns.
Prediction 5 (Correlation) If the correlation between the projects increases ( is larger), then
separate nancing is optimal for a larger set of parameters.
This prediction is similar to the one obtained by Inderst and Müller (2003), but it is driven by
a di¤erent logic. The probability of having two high returns and the probability of having two low
returns increase simultaneously with . As a result, the repayment rate when intermediate default
is avoided is higher because the probability of two low returns is higher. When intermediate default
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cannot be avoided, the repayment rate is lower because the probability of two high returns also
increases. As a consequence, the nancing conditions avoiding intermediate default are tighter and
those not avoiding it looser.
The e¤ects of correlation on the optimality conditions are also intuitive. In the extreme case
with perfect negatively correlation (i.e., if  =  1 and p = 1=2), when one project has a high return
the other necessarily has a low one, so that projects can always be jointly nanced at a rate that
avoids intermediate default.15 Thus, it is clearly optimal to always nance projects jointly when the
negative correlation is perfect. As correlation increases above  =  1, conglomeration is optimal for
a smaller region of parameters. However, the probability of having intermediate returns decreases,
so the di¤erence in expected default costs between joint and separate nancing shrinks. If projects
have perfect positive correlation ( = 1), the conditions for joint and separate nancing are identical
and the rm is clearly indi¤erent between the two nancing regimes.
4 Continuous Returns
Having illustrated the simple logic of bad conglomeration (and nancial dis-synergies) for distribu-
tions with two possible return realizations, in the rest of the paper we extend the analysis to the
more general case with continuous returns. We begin in Section 4.1 by considering only positive re-
turns so as to abstract away from limited liability considerations. The net benets of joint nancing
relative to separate nancing are then equal to the reduction in expected default costs, which we
analytically decompose into coinsurance gains and risk-contamination losses. Turning to a numerical
calibration when the distribution of returns follows a truncation of the normal, we show that the
risk-contamination e¤ect can outweigh the coinsurance e¤ect for continuous distributions. Consis-
tent with the results from our baseline binary model, we verify that the risk-contamination losses
dominate the coinsurance gains if the recovery rate is small (or the fraction of returns lost through
15This is not true for p 6= 1=2 because either the probability of two high realizations or the probability of two low
realizations is greater than 0, even when the correlation is at the lowest possible level.
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default is large), the mean is low, and the standard deviation is large.
In Section 4.2 we proceed to distributions with partly negative support. The net gains of con-
glomeration relative to separate nancing are equal to the change in the limited liability shelter
(which is negative and thus always favors separate nancing) minus the change in expected default
costs (which can be either positive or negative, as we show). Once we further decompose the reduc-
tion in expected default costs into coinsurance gains and risk-contamination losses, we characterize
when conglomeration actually increases expected default costs. To quantify the occurrence of bad
conglomeration, we calibrate the model with normally distributed returns. Conglomeration results
in an increase (rather than a reduction) in expected default costs once the standard deviation is
set at a su¢ciently higher level than at the parameter specication considered by Leland (2007).
Building on an argument originally put forward by Smith and Warner (1979), we initially net out
the limited liability e¤ect, so that the total gains of conglomeration are equal to the reduction in
expected default costs, as in our baseline scenario. Again, we nd that the risk-contamination e¤ect
dominates the coinsurance e¤ect if the recovery rate is small, the mean is low, and the standard
deviation is large. Similar results also hold when the limited liability e¤ect is added to the tradeo¤.
We conclude in Section 4.3 by extending the numerical analysis to allow for stable, bimodal, and
correlated distributions.
4.1 Distributions with Positive Returns
While in our baseline model with binary returns the coinsurance and the risk-contamination e¤ects
are mutually exclusive, these two e¤ects coexist when returns follow a continuous distribution. We
begin by considering two identically and independently distributed projects with continuous density
f(ri) and distribution F (ri) over a non-negative support. The mean of project is returns at t = 2
satises  > 1 to ensure a positive net present value.
Decomposition of Reduction in Expected Default Costs. If the two projects are separately
nanced, each of them should be nanced at the lowest possible rate ri , if any, that ensures that the
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creditors make zero expected prots, i.e.
ri [1  F (r

i )] + 
R ri
0 rif(ri)dri = 1: (4)
Substituting into the rms prots, which are given by
R
1
ri
rif(ri)dri   r

i [1  F (r

i )] ; (5)
implies that the rms prots are equal to the net expected returns minus the expected default costs,
  1 
R ri
0 (1  )rif(ri)dri: (6)
If, instead, the projects are nanced jointly, the zero-prot condition is given by the lowest rm that
satises
rm [1 H(r

m)] + 
R rm
0 rmh(rm)drm = 1 (7)
where
h(rm) :=
R
1
0 f(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dri
is the density and H the distribution of the average of ri and rj , rm := (ri + rj)=2. Per-project rm
prots, which are given by
R
1
rm
rmh(rm)drm   r

m [1 H(r

m)] ; (8)
are then equal to the net expected returns minus the expected default costs,
  1 
R rm
0 (1  )rmh(rm)drm: (9)
The net per-project gains of joint nancing are then equal to the reduction in expected default
costs. That is, subtracting (6) from (9), we obtain  =  DC, where
DC :=
R rm
0 (1  )rmh(rm)drm  
R ri
0 (1  )rif(ri)dri: (10)
We now show that this expression can be rearranged to obtain an intuitive decomposition of the net
gains of conglomeration.
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Figure 2: Decomposition of reduction in expected default costs and limited liability
shelter. The horizontal axis reports the return of project i and the vertical axis the average return
of project i and j, rm = (ri+ rj)=2. The entries report the composition of the reduction in expected
default costs associated to project i in terms of risk-contamination and coinsurance e¤ects, as well
as the limited liability shelter.
Proposition 5 (Decomposition with positive returns) The net nancial synergies (and the
reduction in expected default costs) of two independently distributed projects with continuous den-
sity f with positive support can be decomposed into the coinsurance gains and risk-contamination
losses of conglomeration, i.e.  =  DC = CI  RC, where
CI : =
R
1
rm
R ri
0 (1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm; (11)
RC : =
R rm
0
R
1
ri
(1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm:
The coinsurance gains (CI) are the expected savings obtained because a project i, which would
have defaulted had it been nanced separately (when ri < r

i ), is saved by the other project once
the two projects are nanced jointly (when rm = (ri + rj)=2 > r

m). The risk-contamination losses
(RC) are the expected losses su¤ered because a project i, which would have stayed aoat had it been
nanced separately (when ri > r

i ), is dragged down by the other project with which it is jointly
nanced (when rm = (ri + rj)=2 < r

m).
25
The positive orthant of Figure 2 shows the returns of project i obtained by the rm and its
creditors for each realization of the return, ri (horizontal axis), and for each realization of the average
return, rm (vertical axis), depending on the joint or separate nancing regime. The di¤erence between
the total returns in the two regimes, which is equal to the reduction in expected default costs, is
assigned to coinsurance and risk contamination.
Numerical Analysis for Truncation of Normal Distribution. To quantify the e¤ects we
now turn to an example of a distribution with positive support that is obtained by truncating a
normal distribution at zero and then assigning to the zero return a mass equal to the probability
of the negative realizations of the original normal distribution. This construction leads to a mixed
distribution with a probability mass at 0 and a normal distribution for the positive realizations.
The decomposition derived in Proposition 5 can be easily extended to allow for a mixed distribution
consisting in a probability mass q at 0 and a continuous function g in the positive support such that
R
1
0 rig(ri)dri = 1  q.
Proposition 6 (Decomposition for mixed distributions) The net nancial synergies (and the
reduction in expected default costs) of two independently distributed projects with a mixed distribution
with a probability mass q at 0 and a continuous function g in the positive support can be decomposed
into the coinsurance gains and risk-contamination losses of conglomeration, i.e.  =  DC =
CI  RC, where
CI : =
R
1
rm
R ri
0 (1  )rig(2rm   ri)2g(ri)dridrm +maxfq
R ri
2rm
(1  )rig(ri)dri; 0g;
RC : =
R rm
0
R
1
ri
(1  )rig(2rm   ri)2g(ri)dridrm +maxfq
R 2rm
ri
(1  )rig(ri)dri; 0g:
Note that there is an additional term with respect to Proposition 5, either in the coinsurance
gains (if ri > 2r

m) or in the risk-contamination losses (if r

i < 2r

m). If r

i < 2r

m, the new term
corresponds to the additional risk-contamination losses generated by a project with return 0 and
another with return ri, such that ri > r

i and ri=2 < r

m, because the positive-return project is
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Figure 3: Coinsurance versus risk contamination for the truncation of the normal dis-
tribution. Panels A, B, and C plot the coinsurance gains CI (solid line) and risk-contamination
losses RL (dashed line) with respect to the recovery rate, the mean, and the standard deviation,
respectively.
saved with separate nancing but defaults with joint nancing. If, instead, ri > 2r

m, the new term
corresponds to the coinsurance gains generated because a project with positive return ri < r

i and
ri=2 > r

m defaults with separate nancing, but is saved with joint nancing.
The three panels in Figure 3 perform comparative statics of the coinsurance gains and risk-
contamination losses, with respect to the recovery rate, the mean, and the standard deviation. As
a base case for this distribution, we take a recovery rate of  = 0:8 (or nancial distress costs of
20%, as estimated by Davydenko, Strebulaev, and Zhao, 2012) and a normal distribution with mean
o = 0:8 and standard deviation o = 2:1, resulting in a truncated mixed distribution with mean
 = 1:3 and standard deviation  = 1:49.16 In each of the panels, we x two of the parameters of
the base case and perform comparative statics with respect to the third parameter.17
As can be seen from Figure 3, even with continuous distributions risk-contamination losses can
outweigh coinsurance gains. For parameter values marked by a bold segment, risk contamination
16Keeping xed the other parameters of the base case, projects can be nanced both separately and jointly if  > 0:8,
 > 1:29 and for  < 3:2. In the rst plot, the lowest value of the recovery rate depicted corresponds to the lowest
value such that the projects can be nanced both separately and jointly. In the second and third plots, we have veried
that the lines do not cross for higher or lower parameter values than those depicted.
17Note that a change in the standard deviation of an underlying normal distribution also a¤ects the mean of the
truncated distribution. To keep constant the mean of the truncated distribution, we thus also adjust the mean of the
underlying normal distribution. Similarly, because changes in the mean of the underlying normal distribution a¤ect
the truncated distributions standard deviation, we adjust the standard deviation of the original distribution so as to
keep constant the standard deviation of the truncated distribution.
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dominates coinsurance so that separate nancing is optimal (i) for  < 0:85 when  = 1:3 and
 = 1:49 in panel A (for  = 1 the di¤erence is 0), (ii) for  < 1:31 when  = 1:49 and  = 0:8 in
panel B, and (iii) for  > 1:46 when  = 1:3 and  = 0:8 in panel C. Therefore, and consistent with
the rst three predictions of the baseline model, separation is optimal if the recovery rate is small
(or the nancial distress costs are large), the mean is low, and the standard deviation is high.
4.2 Distributions with Full Support
To better compare our results with Lelands (2007) numerical analysis for normally distributed
returns, we turn to distributions with full support. The limited liability shelter allows both the
creditor and the rm to walk out of negative returns through the bankruptcy process (Leland, 2007,
top of page 770). Default occurs when returns are, instead, positive but insu¢cient to repay the
creditors (page 771). Leland (2007) decomposes the di¤erence in the rms value from joint relative
to separate nancing into:
(i) the change in the limited liability shelter, which is always negative and thus favors separate
nancing,
(ii) plus the tax savings from optimal leveraging, which can favor separate or joint nancing, and
(iii) minus the change in expected default costs, which is negative in all examples considered by
Leland (2007, page 779).
By assuming that the projects need to be nanced only with debt, we abstract away from the
tax e¤ect, (ii). We decompose further the change in the value of default costs, (iii), into a negative
component (coinsurance e¤ect) and a positive component (risk-contamination e¤ect) for the case of
distributions with partly negative support. We then show that risk contamination prevails so that
the change in value of the default costs is actually positive when returns are normally distributed
with variance su¢ciently higher than in the calibration reported by Leland (2007).
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We also note that the limited liability e¤ect, (i), disappears when third parties who su¤er the
liability externality insist on obtaining proper compensation ex ante. The protability of joint or
separate nancing is then determined exclusively by the change in expected default costs, on which
we focus. More generally, we characterize the total e¤ect of (i) and (iii).
Decomposition Revisited and Limited Liability E¤ect We now consider two identically and
independently distributed projects with continuous density f(ri) and distribution F (ri) over the full
support. Given that both the rm and the creditor can walk out of negative returns, the creditor
prots are the same as in the case of positive support distributions, i.e. (4) and (7). Following the
same procedure as before, the rms prots, as dened in (5) and (8), are now equal to the net
expected returns minus the expected default costs and plus the limited liability gains. That is, rm
prots under separate nancing are
  1 
R ri
0 (1  )rif(ri)dri  
R 0
 1
rif(ri)dri; (12)
and under joint nancing
  1 
R rm
0 (1  )rmh(rm)drm  
R 0
 1
rmh(rm)drm; (13)
where
h(rm) =
R
1
 1
f(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dri:
Therefore, the net gains of joint nancing are given by  =  DC+LL, where DC is dened
as
DC :=
R rm
0 (1  )rmh(rm)drm  
R ri
0 (1  )rif(ri)dri: (14)
and the limited liability e¤ect is given by
LL :=  
R 0
 1
rmh(rm)drm +
R 0
 1
rif(ri)dri: (15)
The following proposition summarizes this decomposition and further decomposes the changes in
expected default costs.
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Proposition 7 (Decomposition with possibly negative returns) The net nancial synergies
of two independently distributed projects with continuous density f with full support can be decomposed
into the limited liability e¤ect and the reduction in expected default costs,  = LL   DC,
and the reduction in expected default costs can be decomposed into the coinsurance gains and risk-
contamination losses of conglomeration, i.e.  DC = CI  RC, where
CI :=
R
1
rm
R ri
0 (1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm  
R rm
0
R 0
 1
(1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm;
RC :=
R rm
0
R
1
ri
(1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm  
R 0
 1
R ri
0 (1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm;
LL =  
R 0
 1
R
1
 1
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm +
R 0
 1
R
1
 1
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)drmdri:
To interpret the results, notice that the reduction in expected default costs is equal to the gains
of conglomeration net of the limited liability e¤ect,  DC =  LL. In other words, the change
in default costs equals the gain or loss from conglomeration in a setting with unlimited liability.
Using this observation, we can interpret the two terms in CI and RC that did not appear in the
case of distributions with positive support. The second term in CI represents the additional gains
that arise because, under separate nancing, the returns of the project would have been negative
ri < 0, and therefore the rm would have been responsible for the full losses, whereas, under joint
nancing, the average returns are positive (0 < (ri + rj)=2 < r

m) and therefore part of the average
returns (and thus part of the losses of the project i) are lost as nancial distress costs. Similarly,
the second term in RC represents the reduction in risk-contamination losses that arises because,
under separate nancing, the project would have had a positive return with nancial distress losses
(0 < ri < r

i ), but under joint nancing the average returns are negative ((ri + rj)=2 < 0), and
therefore the rm is fully liable for the average return losses, while also gaining all the returns of
project i. Of course, in the case of positive support distributions, the new two terms are equal to
0: Figure 2 also includes these two terms (labelled CI2 and RC2), along with the limited liability
e¤ect, LL.
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Figure 4: Coinsurance, risk contamination, and limited liability for the normal distri-
bution. Panels A, B, and C in the rst row plot the coinsurance gains CI (solid line) and risk-
contamination losses RL (dashed line) against the recovery rate, the mean, and the standard devi-
ation, respectively. Panels D, E, and F in the second row plot the total prot di¤erence between
joint and separate nancing  (solid line), the limited liability e¤ect LL (dashed line), and the
reduction in expected default costs  DC (dotted line). Panels G, H, and I in the third row plot the
total prot di¤erence between joint and separate nancing  (solid line), and the total di¤erence
net of the risk-contamination losses  +RC (= LL+ CI) (dashed line).
Comparison with Leland (2007). Figure 4 displays when the reduction in expected default
costs,  DC =  LL, is negative, taking as base case a recovery rate of  = 0:8 and a normal
distribution with mean  = 1:3 and standard deviation  = 1:1. Panels A, B, and C plot the
coinsurance gains and risk-contamination losses with respect to the recovery rate, the mean, and the
standard deviation, respectively. As before, the risk-contamination losses dominate the coinsurance
gains if the recovery rate is small, the mean is low, and the standard deviation is high. The parameter
regions for which joint nancing increases expected default costs are marked by a bold segment on
the horizontal axis of each plot.
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Panels D, E, and F perform comparative statics of the incremental prots from joint (relative to
separate nancing), the limited liability e¤ect, and the reduction in expected default costs. Once the
limited liability e¤ect is included, separate nancing is optimal (i) for all values of  when  = 1:3
and  = 1:1 in panel D (for  = 1 the prot di¤erence is equal to the limited liability e¤ect), (ii)
for  < 2:2 when  = 1:1 and  = 0:8 in panel E, and (iii) for  > 0:8 when  = 1:3 and  = 0:8
in panel F.18 These parameter regions correspond to the bold segments marked on the horizontal
axes. For example, the dotted line in Panel F shows that the reduction in expected default costs
is positive (or, equivalently, the change in default costs is negative) for the parameter specication
used by Leland (2007), i.e. with mean  = 1:3 and standard deviation  = 0:5. In addition, the
reduction in expected default costs outweighs the limited liability e¤ect (dashed line) and therefore
joint nancing is optimal (solid line). The same panel also shows that, with the same parameter
specication but with a su¢ciently higher standard deviation ( > 0:8), the reduction in expected
default costs becomes negative and thus separate nancing is optimal. Comparing panels D, E, and
F with panels A, B, and C, we conrm that taking into account the limited liability e¤ect enlarges
the set of parameters for which separate nancing is optimal.
Panels G, H, and I compare the total incremental prot from joint nancing,  (= LL  
DC = LL+CI RC), with the incremental prots net of the risk-contamination e¤ect, LL+CI
(=  + RC). The bold segments on the horizontal axes correspond to the parameter regions for
which joint nancing would have been chosen if risk-contamination losses were disregarded, even
though separate nancing is the preferred nancing regime. Ignoring the risk-contamination e¤ect
would result in too much joint nancing. Indeed, projects with 1:15 <  < 2:2 for  = 1:1 and
 = 0:8 as well as projects with 0:8 <  < 1 for  = 1:3 and  = 0:8 would then be wrongly nanced
jointly rather than separately.
18 In all panels, we show the range of parameters for which projects can be nanced both jointly and separately. In
panels A, D, and G the projects cannot be nanced separately if  < 0:7 and jointly if  < 0:75. In panel B, E, and H
projects cannot be nanced if  < 1:2.
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Exclusion of Limited Liability E¤ect. The limited liability e¤ect favors separate nancing
because the rms returns are assumed to be independent of its corporate structure. Suppose that
the negative return realizations represent the payments that customers or suppliers ling legal claims
against the rm are unable to receive because the rm enjoys limited liability. Since the amount lost
by customers and suppliers is higher with separate nancing, the returns of the rm under separate
nancing should be lowered by a corresponding amount.
A similar argument has been made by Smith and Warner (1979) in a reply to Scotts (1977)
claim that, by issuing secured debt, a rm can increase the value of its securities by reducing the
amount available to pay potential legal damages to customers and suppliers for defective products,
should the rm go bankrupt. Smith and Warner (1979) point out that this is true only because Scott
(1977) unrealistically assumes that the rms net operating earnings are independent of its level of
secured debt. They argue that a customer who buys the rms product purchases both the services
of the product and a security representing the right to sue the rm. If a rm increases its level
of secured debt, it reduces the value of the above-mentioned security which customers receive. A
similar argument applies to the externality imposed on suppliers. The earnings of the rm, which
in part consist of the revenues it receives from the sale of these securities, should thus fall by an
amount equal to the market value of the claim which an increase in secured debt has subtracted from
customers or suppliers. Therefore, once this e¤ect is taken into account, the value of the rm should
be independent of the level of secured debt.
Following the logic of Smith and Warners (1979) argument, the expected value of the rm
should fall exactly by the increased amount that separate nancing has taken away from customers
and suppliers. As a result, the limited liability e¤ect should be netted out from the gains of separate
nancing. An alternative way to make the same point is to view the security mentioned by Smith
and Warner (1979) as an insurance warranty which the rm o¤ers with the product traded. Suppose
that the negative return realizations represent the losses incurred by customers or suppliers that
trade with the rm in case the product is defective and causes damage. The rm o¤ers a full
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insurance security that promises a payment equal to the loss in each possible negative realization.
The willingness to pay by customers or suppliers for this security is equal to the value of limited
liability,  E(rjr < 0). By nancing the projects jointly, the value of this insurance warranty is
reduced exactly by the limited liability e¤ect, and therefore the gains of the rm is reduced exactly
by this amount. However, the actuarially fair price that the rm has to pay for this insurance in a
competitive insurance market will accordingly be reduced by the same amount.
If we use this argument we need to subtract the limited liability e¤ect when computing the
gains from joint nancing. As a result, the prot di¤erence is equal to the reduction in expected
default costs, 0 =    LL =  DC. As shown in Figure 4, joint nancing would then be
more protable because the limited liability e¤ect favored separate nancing. The nancing decision
would then be uniquely determined by the tradeo¤ between the coinsurance and risk-contamination
e¤ects, and the reduction in expected default costs. More generally, the rm could be forced to bear
a fraction of the losses in case of a negative return. In terms of the graphs in Panels D, E, and F,
the prot di¤erence would move from the dotted line (full losses, i.e., without the limited liability
e¤ect) to the solid line (no loss, i.e., with limited liability e¤ect) as we decrease the fraction of the
losses borne by the rm.
4.3 Calibrated Specications and Additional Comparative Statics
We continue our numerical investigations by displaying a number of additional realistic scenarios
in which risk contamination dominates coinsurance so that nancial dis-synergies prevail. We rst
consider a standard calibration of the stable distribution. Then, we consider a bimodal normal with
the same mean and standard deviation as Leland (2007). We also perform comparative statics with
respect to skewness, bimodality, and correlation.
Stable Distribution and Skewness. We consider rst stable distributions (also known as -
Lévy stable distributions), which has been widely used by empiricists to model nancial data. The
class of stable distributions can be seen as a generalization of the normal distribution while allowing
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for skewed (or asymmetric) returns and for tails of varying thickness, features that are frequently
observed in nancial data; see, for example, Mandelbrot (1963), Fama (1965), and Roll (1970). Stable
distributions are the only distributions that retain their shape under addition. The sum (and average)
of two stable distributions is stable, and, if any linear combination of two distributions follow the same
distribution, then this distribution is stable.19 The normal, the Cauchy, and the Lévy distributions
have this property and thus belong to the stable class. In addition, by the Generalized Central
Limit Theorem, the only possible non-trivial limit of normalized sums of independent identically
distributed terms is a stable distribution (Nolan, 2005). Thus, stable distributions represent well
observed data that result from the sum of a large number of small terms.
The class of stable distributions is described by four parameters (; ; ; ). The parameter
 2 (0; 2] is called the stability index. The normal distribution corresponds to the case  = 2; if
 < 2 the distribution exhibits fat tails. The parameter  2 [ 1; 1] is called the skewness index:
if  = 0, the distribution is symmetric, if  > 0 it is skewed towards the right, and if  < 0, it
is skewed towards the left. The parameters  and  determine the shape. The parameter  > 0
is a scale parameter. The parameter  is a location parameter that shifts the distribution to the
right if  > 0, to the left if  < 0, and that is equal to the mean if  > 1 (otherwise the mean
is undened). McCulloch (1997) calibrated the stable distribution with monthly stock market data
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Using 40 years of the CRSP value-weighted
stock index, including dividends and adjusted for ination, his maximum likelihood estimates are
 = 1:855,  =  0:558,  = 2:711, and  = 0:871. These estimates indicate that the data exhibits
fat tails ( < 2) and negative skewness ( < 0).
Panel A of Figure 5 performs comparative static of the prot di¤erence, the limited liability
e¤ect, and the reduction in expected default costs with respect to the skewness. We take as base
case the parameters of the distribution estimated by McCulloch (1997) and, as before, Davydenko,
19Formally, let X1 and X2 be independent copies of a random variable X. Then X is said to be stable if for any
constants a > 0 and b > 0 the random variable aX1 + bX2 has the same distribution as cX + d for some constants
c > 0 and d. The distribution is said to be strictly stable if this holds with d = 0. See Nolan (2005).
35
A B
C D
Figure 5: E¤ects of skewness, bimodality, and correlation. Total prot di¤erence between
joint and separate nancing  (solid line), the limited liability e¤ect LL (dashed line), and the
reduction in expected default costs  DC (dotted line) against the skewness parameter for the
stable distribution in Panel A, the recovery rate and the mixture coe¢cient for the mixed normal
model in Panels B and C, and the correlation coe¢cient for the correlated normal model in Panel D.
Strebulaev, and Zhaos (2012) estimate of the recovery rate.
The gure shows that the change in expected default costs is negative and the risk-contamination
e¤ect dominates the coinsurance e¤ect for McCullochs (1997) calibration of the stable distribution,
which corresponds to  =  0:558. Importantly, and consistent with the results of our baseline
model with binary returns, the risk-contamination e¤ect is relatively more important as the skewness
parameter () decreases. We have also veried that the risk-contamination e¤ect dominates the
coinsurance e¤ect when  = 2, corresponding to the normal distribution ( is irrelevant then), but
it is even more important if the distribution exhibits fatter tails ( < 2). In addition, the risk
contamination e¤ect is enhanced when the recovery rate decreases (or the nancial distress costs
increase) and when the mean decreases (i.e., if  decreases).
Bimodal Distribution. We now turn to a bimodal distribution, which has been recently used to
explain features of the nancial crisis. El-Erian and Spence (2012) report the prevalence of subjective
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bimodal distributions on the part of the investors. They claim in the current environment, there
are two or more scenarios, each quite di¤erent and each with its own distribution of outcomes,
correlations, market functioning and returns. Investors are faced with the need to assess the relative
likelihood of the scenarios, and then take a weighted average of usually two rather more normal
looking distributions to end up with the bimodal one. Here, we show that the risk-contamination
e¤ect also dominates the coinsurance e¤ect for a bimodal distribution with the same mean and
standard deviation as Leland (2007).
Consider a mixture of two normal distributions, dened as one normal random variable with
probability  and another normal random variable with probability 1   , where  2 (0; 1) is the
mixture coe¢cient. As a base case, take an equal probability ( = 0:5) of a normal with mean
1 = 0:9 and standard deviation 1 = 0:41, and another with mean 2 = 1:7 and standard deviation
2 = 0:1. The resulting distribution has mean  = 1:3 and standard deviation  = 0:5, as in the
base case of Leland (2007). As before, we take as base case a recovery rate of  = 0:8.
Panels B and C of Figure 5 perform comparative statics of the prot di¤erence, the limited
liability e¤ect, and the reduction in expected default costs with respect to the recovery rate and
the mixture coe¢cient. Panel B shows that the risk-contamination e¤ect dominates the coinsurance
e¤ect in a distribution with the same expectation and standard deviation as Leland (2007) as long
as the recovery rate is small (i.e., if  < 0:73), consistent with the baseline model. Panel C, in
addition, shows that the e¤ect is relatively more important when the bimodal distribution assigns
more weight to the distribution with lower mean. We have also veried that the risk-contamination
e¤ect is relatively more important if the mean of any of the two normal distributions in the mixture
is lower and/or their standard deviation is larger, as in our baseline binary model.
Correlation. Using the normal specication of Section 4.2 we now show that an increase in cor-
relation favors separate nancing.20 Panel D in Figure 5 performs comparative statics of the prot
20The average distribution of two identical normal distributions with mean  and standard deviation  is a normal
distribution with mean  and standard deviation
p
(1 + ) =2, where  is their correlation coe¢cient. Clearly, if  = 0
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di¤erence, the limited liability e¤ect, and the reduction in expected default costs with respect to
the correlation coe¢cient. The gure shows that the reduction in expected default costs from joint
nancing is negative if  >  0:3. When the limited liability e¤ect is disregarded the increase in total
prots is also negative, and also remains negative more generally because the limited liability e¤ect
is negative. As in the binary model, increasing correlation favors separate nancing, while decreasing
correlation favors joint nancing.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the simple economics of conglomeration with default costs. Our results qualify
the long-standing claim that joint nancing generates nancial benets by economizing on default
costs. By turning on its head the classic logic that generates coinsurance savings from conglomeration,
we characterize instances in which expected default costs increase because of risk contamination.
For projects with binary returns we provide a complete characterization of the tradeo¤ between
coinsurance and risk contamination. Broadly consistent with empirical evidence, the analysis predicts
that:
 An increase in the fraction of returns lost due to default costs favors separate nancing;
 An increase in average returns favors joint nancing;
 An increase in the riskiness of returns favors separate nancing;
 An increase in the negative skewness of returns favors separate nancing;
 An increase in the correlation of returns favors separate nancing.
In addition, we show that separate nancing can be optimal even when joint nancing involves paying
a lower repayment rate or results in a lower probability of default.
The analysis in this paper restricts attention to two ex-ante identical projects that had to be
nanced with debt only and with default costs proportional to the value of the assets under default.
we are back to the baseline scenario with independent returns.
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In a model with binary returns, Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2013) investigate the optimal structure
of nancial conglomeration with projects that have heterogeneous returns, a multiple number of
projects, general specications of default costs, and nancing through tax-disadvantaged equity:
 Coinsurance and risk contamination e¤ects may be present simultaneously in a setting with
two projects with binary but heterogeneous returns, as in the case of identical projects with
continuous return distributions.
 With more than two projects, sometimes it is optimal to partially conglomerate projects into
subgroups of intermediate size. However, when the number of independent projects becomes
arbitrarily large, the risk-contamination e¤ect vanishes and it becomes optimal to nance all
the projects jointly.
 Economies of scale in default costs (according to which per-project default costs are lower when
projects are nanced jointly) favor joint nancing, while diseconomies of scale favor separate
nancing.
 Allowing for nancing through tax-disadvantaged equity tends to favor joint nancing, be-
cause equity nancing sometimes makes it possible to obtain a repayment rate that avoids
intermediate default when one project yields a high return and the other yields a low return.
In our setup, either investors in each of the two projects have recourse to the returns of the
other project (with joint nancing) or none of them have access to the returns of the other project
(with separate nancing). In reality, an asymmetric, intermediate situation could also arise whereby
investors in one (recourse) project have access to the returns of the other (nonrecourse) project, but
not conversely. In this case, one of the diagonal entries in Figure 1 would be akin to separate nancing.
That is, if the project without recourse yielded a low return while the project with recourse yielded
a high return, the former project would go bankrupt while the latter project would stay aoat. In
the other diagonal entry, however, both projects would stay aoat provided that the recourse project
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is saved by the nonrecourse project. If this is the case, this intermediate solution would dominate
separate nancing, but the reverse would hold when the recourse project is dragged down by the
nonrecourse project. A complete analysis for the resulting tradeo¤ is left to future research; see
Nicodano and Luciano (2009) for an investigation in this direction in a setting with both default
costs and taxes.
Saving an unsuccessful project might sometimes be optimal for reputational reasons, even if
it has been nanced with (nonrecourse) debt and the rm is under no legal obligation to save it.
Gorton (2008), for example, points out that securitization issuers retain substantial implicit exposure
even after mortgages are securitized. In the credit card asset-based securities (ABS) market, for
example, Higgins and Mason (2004) document instances in which issuers of credit card ABS have
taken back non-performing loans despite not being contractually required to do so. Similarly, Gorton
and Souleles (2006) show that prices paid by investors in credit card ABS take into account issuers
ability to bail out their ABS. To capture this tradeo¤, one could extend our static model to a dynamic
framework. It is also natural to extend the model to allow for multiple (and possibly risk-averse)
investors, as in Bonds (2004) analysis of conglomeration versus bank intermediation in the costly
state verication model.
Finally, our model can also be extended to analyze the public policy problem of optimal con-
glomeration in the presence of systemic spillovers, a topic that has recently attracted attention (see,
for example, Acharya, 2009, and Ibragimov, Ja¤ee, and Walden, 2011). In this case, bankruptcies
create signicant negative externalities and the borrower should minimize the probability of default
instead of maximizing net returns. We leave the development of this extension to future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows from the analysis reported in the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: If projects can be nanced separately, i.e. condition (1) is satised, the
entrepreneur obtains a per-project return of p(rH   r

i ), which is equal to the ex post net present
value
prH + (1  p)rL   1: (16)
Similarly, if condition (2) is satised, the entrepreneur obtains a per-project return of p2(rH   r

m)+
2p(1  p) [(rH + rL)=2  r

m], or
p2rH + 2p(1  p)(rH + rL)=2 +  (1  p)
2 rL   1; (17)
and, if condition (3) but (2) is not satised, she obtains p2(rH   r

m ), or
p2rH + 2p(1  p)(rH + rL)=2 +  (1  p)
2 rL   1: (18)
Subtracting (17) from (16), we obtain (1  ) p(1   p)rL and therefore joint nancing is more
protable than separate nancing. Instead, subtracting (16) from (17), we obtain (1  ) (1  p)prH
and therefore separate nancing is more protable than joint nancing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 1: The statements follow from the fact that the derivatives of the left-hand of
(1), (2), and (3) with respect to  are negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 2: The statements follow from the fact that the derivatives of the left-hand of
(1), (2), and (3) with respect to p are negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 3: Letting " be such that brH = rH + ", we have that, in order to have a mean
preserving spread, brL = rL   p1 p". Substituting into condition (2), the derivative of the left-hand
side less the derivative of the right-hand side is equal to
1  p
2  p
 +
1
2(1  p)
  1;
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which is positive if and only if p > p, where p 
h
1 + 4(1  ) 
p
1 + 8(1  )
i
=2(1 ). Therefore,
condition (2) is less likely to be satised following an increase in " if and only if p > p. It can be
easily checked that p < 1=2 for any . Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 4: Letting " be such that brL = rL   ", we have that, in order to have a mean
preserving spread, bp = p   (1 p)"
rH rL+"
. Following the same procedure as in the proof of the previous
prediction, there exists rH , such that condition (2) is less likely to be satised following an increase
in " if and only if r > rH . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Suppose that  and rL are arbitrarily close to 1, condition (2) is arbitrarily
close to rH+rL2 > 1 whereas condition (1) simplies to rH > 1. Clearly there are situations in which
condition (2) is satised, and therefore projects can be nanced jointly, but condition (1) is not
satised, and therefore projects cannot be nanced separately.
(ii) If condition (2) is not satised, projects can only be nanced jointly if condition (3) is satised.
Condition (3) can be rewritten as
prH   p(1  p)rH(1  ) + (1  p) rL > 1:
This implies that prH+(1  p) rL > 1, which in turn implies that projects can be nanced separately.
Of course, the opposite is not true, if the parameters are such that prH + (1  p) rL is arbitrarily
close to 1, then condition (3) is not satised. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose rst that a rate below the crossing point can be obtained. We have
that
rm =
1  (1  p)2 rL
1  (1  p)2
<
1  (1  p)rL
p
= ri ,
because 1 > rL. Next, suppose that only a rate r

m above the crossing point can be obtained and
therefore the probability of default is higher with joint nancing. Nevertheless, the rate rm associated
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with joint nancing is lower than ri associated with separate nancing whenever
rm =
1  (1  p)  (prH + rL)
p2
<
1  (1  p) rL
p
= ri ;
or equivalently when
rH >
1  (1  p)rL
p
= ri ;
as claimed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 5: Clearly, separate nancing is not a¤ected by correlation. The joint nancing
repayment rates, rm and r

m in Proposition 1, and the corresponding nancing conditions, are now
replaced by rm; and r

m;, respectively, where
rm; :=
1  (1  p) [1  p (1  )] rL
1  (1  p) [1  p (1  )]
<
rH + rL
2
;
and
rm; :=
1  (1  p) rL
p [1  (1  p) (1  ) (1  )]
< rH :
Note that rm; and r

m; are respectively increasing and decreasing in . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: We show the split of the reduction of the expected default costs  DC,
where DC is dened in (10), into the two terms in the statement of the proposition. We rst
rewrite DC=(1  ) using that h(rm) =
R
1
0 f(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dri in the rst term and introducingR
1
0 f(2rm   ri)2drm(= 1 for all ri) in the second term, to obtain
DC=(1  ) =
R rm
0
R
1
0 rmf(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm  
R ri
0
R
1
0 rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)drmdri: (19)
We then decompose the rst term in the right-hand side of (19) into two terms using rm =  (ri  
rm) + ri, split the second integral that results, and also split the second term of (19) to obtain
DC=(1  ) =  
R rm
0
R
1
0 (ri   rm)f(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm
+
R rm
0
R ri
0 rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm +
R rm
0
R
1
ri
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm
 
R ri
0
R
1
rm
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)drmdri  
R ri
0
R rm
0 rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)drmdri:
Note that the rst term is equal to 0. Using the law of iterating expectations to alter the order of
the integrals of the second term, we the second and the fth terms also cancel out. Applying again
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the law of iterating expectations, and rearranging the remaining terms, we have that
 DC =
R
1
rm
R ri
0 (1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm  
R rm
0
R
1
ri
(1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm;
as we intended to show. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Dene j(r) := g(r)=(1  q) as the density of a distribution function dened
on the strictly positive part, so that
R
1
0 j(ri)dr1 = 1, and the mixed distribution function is given by
F (r) := q + (1  q)
R r
0 j(ri)dri
whereas the distribution of the average is given by
H(r) := q2 + 2q(1  q)
R r
0 j(2rm)2drm + (1  q)
2
R r
0
R
1
0 j(ri)j(2rm   ri)2dridrm:
Following the same procedure as before, the net per-project gains of joint nancing are again equal
to the reduction in the expected default costs,  =  DC, which are now given by
DC : = (1  q)2
R rm
0
R
1
0 (1  )rmj(ri)j(2rm   ri)2dridrm +
2q(1  q)
R rm
0 (1  )rmj(2rm)2drm   (1  q)
R ri
0 (1  )rij(ri)dri
Now, the expected default costs in joint nancing are separated in two terms because, while the
average return is lower than rm, the return of one of them can be 0 or both of them are positive (if
both are 0 there are no default costs).
We now provide the decomposition into coinsurance and risk-contamination e¤ects. We rewrite
DC=[(1  )(1  q)] by decomposing the last term into two terms, using 1 = (1  q) + q, and then
introducing
R
1
0 j(2rm   ri)2drm(= 1 for all ri) in the rst of those two terms to obtain
DC=[(1  )(1  q)] = (1  q)
R rm
0
R
1
0 rmj(2rm   ri)2j(ri)dridrm + 2q
R rm
0 rmj(2rm)2drm
 (1  q)
R ri
0
R
1
0 rij(2rm   ri)2j(ri)drmdri   q
R ri
0 rij(ri)dri:
Now, from the proof of Proposition 5, the rst and the third terms are equal to the rst two
terms below. The sum of the second and fourth terms, performing a change of variable, 2rm = ri, in
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the second one, can be written as the last term below
DC=[(1  )(1  q)] = (1  q)
R rm
0
R
1
ri
rij(2rm   ri)2j(ri)dridrm
 (1  q)
R ri
0
R
1
rm
rij(2rm   ri)2j(ri)drmdri + q
R 2rm
ri
rij(ri)dri:
Using the law of iterating expectations and rewriting, using g(r) = (1  q)j(r), we have
 DC =
R
1
rm
R ri
0 (1  )rig(2rm   ri)2g(ri)dridrm
 
R rm
0
R
1
ri
(1  )rig(2rm   ri)2g(ri)dridrm   q
R 2rm
ri
(1  )rig(ri)dri;
as desired. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: We show the split of the reduction in expected default costs  DC, dened
in (14), into the four terms reported in the statement of the proposition. We rst rewriteDC=(1 )
using that h(rm) =
R
1
 1
f(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dri and introducing
R
1
 1
f(2rm   ri)2drm (which is equal
to 1 for all ri) in the second term to obtain
DC=(1  ) =
R rm
0
R
1
 1
rmf(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm  
R ri
0
R
1
 1
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)drmdri: (20)
We then decompose the rst term of the right-hand side of (20) into two terms using rm =  (ri  
rm) + ri and then split the second integral that results and the second term of (20) to obtain
DC=(1  ) =  
R rm
0
R
1
 1
(ri   rm)f(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm
+
R rm
0
R ri
 1
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm +
R rm
0
R
1
ri
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm
 
R ri
0
R
1
rm
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)drmdri  
R ri
0
R rm
 1
rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)drmdri:
Note that the rst term is equal to 0. Using the law of iterating expectations to alter the order of
the integrals of the second term, part of the integral in the second and in the fth terms cancel out.
Applying again the law of iterating expectations, and rearranging the remaining terms, we obtain
 DC =
R
1
rm
R ri
0 (1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm  
R rm
0
R 0
 1
(1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm
 
R rm
0
R
1
ri
(1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm +
R 0
 1
R ri
0 (1  )rif(2rm   ri)2f(ri)dridrm;
as we intended to show. Q.E.D.
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